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Abstract
Background: Field trials have demonstrated the efficacy of insecticide-treated nets, and the WHO has recently
endorsed a shift toward Long-Lasting Insecticide Treated nets (LLINs) due to factors such as reduced distribution
costs. However, the need for LLINs poses several challenges. Is it possible to manufacture LLINs in large quantities
in the African continent, where malaria is most endemic? When production is located in low-income countries,
what role is played by local funding and employment, scaling up manufacturing, and partnerships? What factors
influence availability and pricing?
Discussion: A case study of A to Z Textiles was undertaken to answer the question of how large-scale production
of LLINs can occur in a low income setting. One of the largest sources of bed nets for Africa, A to Z Textiles is
Africa-based, and its Tanzanian operations have a production capacity of 30 million LLINs per year, along with full
WHO recommendation for its nets. Our analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with key informants familiar
with A to Z, site visits in Tanzania, and literature reviews.
This paper discusses the history and current status of A to Z Textiles, identifies the factors that led to its success,
and suggests policy considerations that could support similar initiatives in the future. Local funding, scaling up
manufacturing, technology transfer, and partnerships all played important roles in A to Z’s ascent, as did perceived
benefits of local employment and capacity-building. Regulatory issues and procurement rules acted as barriers. A
to Z cost-effectively manufactures high-quality LLINs where malaria is most endemic.
Summary: With a production capacity of 30 million LLINs per year, and full WHOPES (WHO Pesticide Evaluation
Scheme) certification, A to Z Textiles demonstrates how key health goods can be successfully produced in the low-
income countries that use them. Its example may be instructive and of high interest to readers in the malaria
community, especially in developing countries, and to those who wish to support or partner with efforts by
developing countries to build their health innovation capacity.
Background
Most of the malaria disease burden is in Africa, with a
cost in human life of around one million deaths per
year, of which a large majority are children [1]. Among
several approaches such as vector control strategies that
are being pursued to prevent malaria, insecticide-treated
nets (ITNs) are one of the best current public health
interventions in terms of safety and cost-effectiveness
[1]. Large-scale studies have documented the beneficial
impact of ITNs on reducing malaria mortality and mor-
bidity, including infant mortality [2,3].
More recently, a shift toward Long-Lasting Insecti-
cide-treated Nets (LLINs) has been endorsed by the
WHO Global Malaria Programme (WHO/GMP) [4].
LLINs are made with material that has insecticide
bound around or incorporated within the fibers. They
must retain effectiveness for at least 20 WHO standard
washes (i.e. laboratory procedures that simulate usage)
and three years of use in field conditions. LLINs reduce
the need for retreatment and replacement of nets, offer
longer protection for users, and help reduce distribution
and maintenance costs.
While the reasons for preferring LLINs are clear, the
production of LLINs poses several challenges. Is it
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African continent, where malaria is most endemic?
When production is located in low-income countries,
what role is played by local funding and employment,
scaling up manufacturing, and partnerships? How do
regulatory issues and procurement rules affect the viabi-
lity of LLIN production? What factors influence avail-
ability and pricing?
These issues are illustrated in the case of Africa’sl a r -
gest bed net manufacturer, A to Z Textiles – a family-
based Tanzanian enterprise that grew from humble
beginnings to become a major bed net manufacturer. A
to Z illustrates the role of African entrepreneurship in
successful technology transfer and development. It
shows how supportive partnerships can mobilize the
South’s capacity to tackle its own health challenges.
We used a case study design. Our analysis is based on
semi-structured interviews with key informants familiar
with A to Z, site visits in Tanzania, and literature analy-
sis of background documents on A to Z, related articles
from the peer-reviewed literature, news reports, books,
web sites, and relevant reports from WHO (the World
Health Organization) and other groups. We conducted
interviews with personnel of A to Z, and with PSI
(Population Services International), Acumen Fund, and
Tanzanian government and health organizations, all of
whom interacted with A to Z in its bed net endeavors.
A to Z was asked to fact-check the case study; the ana-
lysis and interpretation is our own. All quotes are from
the interviews unless otherwise noted, and with permis-
sion. This study was approved by the Office of Research
Ethics of the University of Toronto.
In this article, we summarize the history and current
status of A to Z Textiles, and analyze the factors that
led to its success. We then suggest policy considerations
that could further support similar producers of health
goods in low income settings in the future.
Discussion
A chance meeting
A to Z Textiles is based in Arusha, Tanzania. The com-
pany started in 1965 with five sewing machines run by
family members of the late N.H. Shah (father of the cur-
rent CEO Anuj Shah). The family initially made gar-
ments for the local market, and in 1978 they started
producing bed nets.
In 1998, Professor Don De Savigny, then with Canada’s
International Development Research Centre, was visiting
Arusha with Dr. Hassan Mshinda, then director of
Tanzania’s Ifakara Health Research Institute. They had
come to meet the owners of Sun Flag, a local company
that made bed nets.
While insecticide-treated bed nets were not new, they
had a significant problem: they needed to be regularly
re-dosed with insecticide. The companies that made the
insecticide preferred to sell it by the barrel, and the con-
sumers who bought the nets often had more urgent
priorities than bringing the nets to a central depot to be
re-treated. De Savigny hoped Sun Flag would partner
with an initiative from PSI (Population Services Interna-
tional, a non governmental organization with global
operations) to provide home treatment kits that people
could use to dose the nets themselves.
Sun Flag wasn’t interested, and De Savigny and
Mshinda found themselves back on the street.
Dr. Mshinda pointed out that there was another bed net
manufacturer across the road: a 33-year old family-run
company called A to Z Textiles. With nothing to lose,
the two men knocked on the gate at A to Z. They were
met by Anuj Shah and his Production Director, Binesh
Haria.
Opportunity and pitch
The timing of De Savigny and Mshinda’s visit might not
have been right for Sun Flag, but it was perfect for A to
Z .D eS a v i g n ya n dM s h i n d aw e r el o o k i n gf o rw a y st o
alleviate the suffering caused by malaria, and when they
pitched the home treatment kit as a business opportu-
nity, Anuj Shah immediately saw its potential.
By the mid 1990s, their business had been facing chal-
lenges for years because trade liberalization in the 1980s
had resulted in a large influx of cheaper second hand
clothing into the local Tanzanian garments market. A to
Z already made bed nets, but neither Anuj nor Binesh
had guessed how important nets could be in the fight
against malaria.
According to De Savigny, he told Anuj Shah, “If you
get into this, you could steal the margin on this, because
the public sector is about to start promoting this pro-
duct.” He pointed out that public sector institutions
were never going to promote A to Z’s baseball caps or
T-shirts, “but they will promote this one, and if you
have a better net [than Sun Flag], you’re going to get
the business.”
This first meeting with A to Z was cordial, but as De
Savigny put it, “We thought, well, it’sa n o t h e ro n eo f
these factories and they’re not going to listen to us…it
was a very polite meeting and we got their attention,
but we didn’t think too much about this afterward.” De
Savigny and Mshinda left Arusha to continue promoting
the home kits for re-dosing ITNs elsewhere. Six months
after that first encounter, a meeting was held in Dar es
Salaam by Canada’s International Development Research
Centre, PSI, and Health Bridge Canada. The purpose of
the meeting was to bring the public sector, private sec-
tor, and NGOs together to explore ways to engage both
the public and private sectors in rolling out ITNs across
Tanzania. A to Z was invited to the meeting, but no one
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what happened:
“We had a reception to kick off the meeting and we
had the Chamber of Commerce, the various Minis-
tries, and the high level officials from the Ministry of
Health… we made an exhibition space in the recep-
tion area for the insecticide manufacturers [who
were] by then making kits, and for any net manufac-
turers who wanted to show up. So Sun Flag came
a n dt h e yh u n gu pt h e i rs t a n dard white conical net
on this white wall. And just before the speeches
started, in came Binesh and Anuj. As we said, we
never thought we’d see these people again, and they
walked in and they hung up their very first six foot
by six foot green, silky rectangular net – [a] huge
n e t ,a n dt h e yh u n gi tu po nt h ew a l la n de v e r y b o d y
flocked over there to see this fantastic new, domestic
net. AMREF, the African Medical Research Founda-
tion, was there from Nairobi and they went up and
they gave an order for 100,000 on the spot.”
From Arusha to Tokyo
By 2003 A to Z was the largest producer of conventional
(i.e. non long-lasting) insecticide impregnated nets in
Africa, producing over 6 million nets annually. This suc-
cess was enabled by A to Z’s strengths in plastics, tex-
tiles, and production technologies, which positioned A
to Z to scale up production and adopt new technologies
when Sumitomo Chemical Company of Japan presented
them with an even bigger opportunity.
Sumitomo was founded in 1913, and has grown to be
a multinational organization with over 100 companies in
sectors including basic chemicals, petrochemicals, fine
chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Since the 1980s, scien-
tists at Sumitomo had been developing insect-repellent
products. Their LLINs had insecticide incorporated into
the fiber of the net, which allowed them to release
insecticide for up to 5 years. Primarily a chemical com-
pany, Sumitomo lacked expertise in packaging, market-
ing, and distribution in the developing world, and was
searching for a partner.
In 2002 the World Health Organization (WHO) and
the Roll Back Malaria Partnership approached Sumi-
tomo, encouraging the company to look into manufac-
turing “Olyset” L L I N si nA f r i c a .At oZw a so n e
company short-listed by WHO for Sumitomo to visit,
and was deemed an attractive candidate with expertise
in both textiles and plastics.
The dynamic synergy between A to Z Textiles and
Sumitomo led to a royalty-free technology transfer of
Olyset LLIN technology to A to Z. The technology
transfer was facilitated by WHO, the social venture
capital group Acumen Fund, and the Roll Back Malaria
Partnership [5]. Dr. Mshinda further explains the terms
of the transfer:
“The technology transfer entails that the raw mate-
rial with the insecticide inside is provided by Sumi-
tomo in its pellet form, along with their expertise
around the technology. A to Z’s expertise lies in
manufacturing this product. Sumitomo is basically a
chemical company, so they do not have that exper-
tise in manufacturing. The actual process of incor-
porating the insecticide remains with Sumitomo,
which is a [trade] secret.”
A to Z today: capacity and clinical evidence
The technology transfer for Olyset bed nets was com-
pleted in November 2003, heralding the start of the
business partnership between Sumitomo and A to Z
Textiles. They began with a trial run of 300 000 LLINS
in 2003, reached 1.5 million in 2005, and by 2009 pro-
duction had grown to 25 million Olyset bed nets per
year.
A to Z also produces textiles, plastics, and bottled
water. In 2009, LLINs accounted for roughly 80% of
total revenue and 90-95% of production. The joint ven-
ture with Sumitomo dedicated to Olyset production was
set up in 2005 as an affiliated company, Vector Health
International, in which Sumitomo and A to Z reportedly
made equal initial co-investments of $7.5 million.
As of 2010, A to Z was a profitable enterprise employ-
ing over 7000 staff. Their annual production of 25 mil-
lion nets was projected to increase to 30 million nets
during 2010. Only 5% of A to Z’s output goes to private
buyers, mainly the middle and upper class. A to Z’s big-
gest non-private buyers are organizations like UNICEF,
and the governments of Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi
and Kenya, which have a variety of distribution models
and subsidization schemes to deliver nets to end users.
A to Z anticipates a total need of around 280 million
b e dn e t si nA f r i c ao v e rt h en e x tt h r e ey e a r s ;i . e .am a r -
ket demand of approximately 85 million nets per year.
Of these, A to Z is projected to produce roughly 30 mil-
lion Olyset nets annually in partnership with Sumitomo,
and Sumitomo is projected to produce an additional 21
million Olyset nets in facilities based in China and
Vietnam.
By way of comparison, according to the World
Malaria Report 2009, in 2008 manufacturers cumula-
tively reported a total of 57 million bed nets delivered
to African countries, and ministries of health cumula-
tively reported a total of 38 million bed nets distributed
within African countries [6]. (The report suggests that
the difference between these two figures could be due to
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record-keeping, distribution by the private sector that is
not included in ministry of health data, or other
unknown factors.)
The Olyset net was the first LLIN to gain full WHO
recommendation under the WHO Pesticide Evaluation
Scheme (WHOPES), in October 2001 [7]. It was one of
only two LLINs to have achieved full WHO recommen-
dation as of August 2009, the other being the Vester-
gaard Frandsen Permanet 2.0 [8]. (The latter was
reported in company documents to be manufactured in
Vietnam and Thailand, and have a cumulative total of
over 170 million distributed worldwide.) Olyset is the
only LLIN with full WHO recommendation being man-
ufactured in Africa.
There is evidence that Olyset nets retain some efficacy
even after seven years in the field [9,10]. However, after
a review of available evidence in 2009, the WHOPES
Working Group decided not to extend WHO full
recommendation from 3 to 5 years [11], indicating that
the evidence could not prove that sufficient efficacy was
maintained in the 4
th and 5
th years.
We turn now to a discussion of what helped A to Z
succeed, and what their example suggests for future
development of health solutions in low-resource
settings.
Lessons learned
Family funding and entrepreneurship
At oZ ’s holdings are primarily family-owned – the Shah
family has invested millions of dollars, making them the
biggest investor along with Sumitomo. Family financing
is a common formula in African and South Asian busi-
ness ventures, especially when alternative risk capital is
absent, as it can provide both capital and “smart money”
that knows what ventures are feasible in the local envir-
onment [12]. While family financing holds long-term
risks from infighting, loss of competence, and corrup-
tion, evidence of this was not found in the case of A to
Z, and family firms dominate in most countries with
short industrial histories [13].
The fact that the Shahs chose to take the risk of
investing in LLIN production was itself a key decision
point; the chance meeting with De Savigny and Mshinda
in 1998 was key to making this opportunity apparent.
Similarly, the Sumitomo partnership for Olyset produc-
tion was a second key decision point, in which several
partners assisted [5]. These two decision points may
illustrate the potential benefit to future funders and
entrepreneurs of “global health market intelligence” that
makes key opportunities more apparent.
Manufacturing at scale and partnerships
A to Z has been instrumental in bringing manufacturing
to scale in Tanzania while addressing an important
health problem. There appear to be three main reasons
why A to Z has been able to go from manufacturing
300 000 LLINs per year in 2003 to 25 million per year
in 2009, with a projected 30 million per year in 2010.
First, by the time it had begun discussions with Roll
Back Malaria and Sumitomo around LLINs, it was
already the largest African manufacturer of ITN nets,
producing over 6 million nets by 2003. This prior manu-
facturing experience was critical in navigating the 2004
Olyset manufacturing ramp-up.
Secondly, A to Z had developed a strong partnership
with Sumitomo that not only provided the technology,
but also provided financial support through their joint
venture. Without the Sumitomo partnership and LLIN
technology, A to Z would have experienced difficulty in
achieving WHO certification and consequent sales; how-
ever, without A to Z’s strengths in distribution and local
manufacturing, Sumitomo likely could not have achieved
the African market success it has. Several parties were
involved in making A to Z’sp a r t n e r s h i p sh a p p e n ,
including WHO, PSI, and Acumen Fund [5]. A to Z
itself understood and exploited potential partnerships,
most notably in the partnership with Sumitomo for Oly-
set production. Such relationships can provide incen-
tives and de-risking for the private sector in the
developing world to engage in innovation and address
health challenges, by making opportunities clearer and
by bringing together organizations with complementary
capacities. (Indeed, there may be value to doing this sort
of matchmaking more systematically – both for South-
ern enterprises looking to get into the health field, and
for Northern organizations wishing to find capable and
reliable Southern partners [14].)
Finally, A to Z benefited from commitment and large
demand from buyers, mainly the donor community.
About 95% of production goes to non-private buyers,
such as UNICEF, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Malaria and Tuberculosis, the President’s Malaria Initia-
tive, PSI, and African governments. In the absence of
donor and public funding, i.e. relying solely on local pri-
vate buyers, A to Z would have had to lower volume
sold, pricing, or both – suggesting the catalytic role that
donor and public funding can play in scaling up South-
ern manufacturing. It remains to be seen whether local
demand (both public and private) will supplant interna-
tional funding over time. To support similar future ven-
tures, it may be helpful to study the de-risking role to
producers of commitments from public buyers made in
advance of production, in order to entice the private
sector into areas of public health they would normally
not enter [15].
Distribution and marketing
A to Z has used three linked distribution channels. First,
a traditional private distribution network, done through
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eastern and southern Africa. Second, a mobile distribu-
tion system composed of a fleet of 150 trucks within
Tanzania, which is supplemented by trucks hired from
transport companies if demand warrants, and reaches
countries surrounding Tanzania including Kenya,
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Burundi, and
Rwanda. (One 40-foot container holds 26 000 nets.)
Third, for their public sector buyers, A to Z delivers
the nets to designated warehouses or the appropriate
Ministries of Health, building on their private and
mobile distribution systems. This represents a significant
advantage over their international competitors, who may
only deliver to national ports. Looking ahead, there may
be opportunities for manufacturers like A to Z to
expand their logistics support to public sector buyers
and NGOs, in areas such as training users or monitoring
bednet replacement statistics.
Regulation and tendering
Being one of only two LLINs to gain full WHO approval
has made Olyset a preferred product for buyers. At the
same time, Anuj Shah notes that some tenders for bed-
nets require only interim WHO certification, for which
there are more competitors (six as of August 2009) [8].
Even though bednets with the full certification are sup-
ported by a greater evidence base from field trials, this
distinction has not been implemented by some buyers
in the tendering process, which may put A to Z and
other fully-certified manufacturers at a competitive dis-
advantage if they invest more in quality.
Some tenders for LLINs evaluate bids only on the cost
to the port of shipping. Anuj Shah suggests requiring
full certification in tenders, and using the price to village
as the tender price: “I think the responsibility of deliver-
ing the nets to the village should be on the manufac-
turers. Donor should say that you deliver. How you
deliver is up to you.” Using “full-cost” pricing could be a
win-win situation, with buyers and funders able to eval-
uate long-term pricing for the provision of malaria pro-
tection to end users, and manufacturers able to invest in
building up quality and distribution expertise.
Looking forward: need for innovation
Looking forward, A to Z faces the prospect of market
saturation and a plateau in demand for their bed nets in
the 2011 to 2013 time frame. In addition, other African
LLIN manufacturing partnerships have recently
emerged. Duranet, an LLIN with interim WHO certifi-
cation, has been manufactured in Uganda on a low-
volume trial basis starting in December 2009, in co-
operation with two local companies [16]. AED, Bayer
Environmental Science, and Siamdutch Mosquito Net-
ting Company of Thailand developed a system treating
finished nets with LLIN chemistry; this system was
reportedly installed by Sunflag/Nigeria in 2009 [17].
Sumitomo itself has in 2009 established an Olyset net
sewing operation in Ethiopia, in a joint venture with an
Ethiopian company with a projected production of 3
million in its first year; Sumitomo has also stated its
intention to build a Nigerian factory [18].
One response to these challenges that A to Z is
exploring is increased investment in R&D, including
adding laboratory facilities and local scientific talent. A
to Z has already hired one full time scientist who used
to work with WHO. Having benefited from one technol-
ogy – indeed, having integrated a culture of technology
into their business – they now seek to identify and
exploit other opportunities, including potential linkages
with domestic scientists and further partnerships with
companies like Sumitomo.
In combination with R&D innovation, A to Z faces
pressure to continue its business model innovation,
through means such as further developing delivery cap-
abilities, and improving packaging and user training.
Other innovations may straddle R&D and business, such
as cost reduction and more effective bednet efficacy
maintenance. While continuous innovation and
improvement is a linchpin of business globally, A to Z’s
experience illustrates the importance of an integrated
view of innovation covering technical, business, and
social aspects.
A reflection from Anuj Shah illustrates the manage-
ment’s acceptance of both economic and health goals:
…My biggest motivation is the number of lives we are
saving. That is a real motivation. That’s one. Number
two – Africa needs jobs and without people getting
jobs, this continent will never develop. The more jobs
that are created gives me personal satisfaction that at
least people are having an activity, they’re earning out
of it and they are benefiting out of it.
Of course the company is growing so that is really
something very, very important for me and really
motivates me. Third thing – when I wake up, it
m a k e sm ef e e lt h a tw eh a v et om a k es u r et h a tw e
have enough orders for the [7000] people to have
enough work to carry on, so that itself is a challenge
a n da l s ot os o m ee x t e n ti t ’s a motivation. It always
puts you on the edge; we just need to get an order.
If you don’t have the orders, where are these people
going to be sleeping, what are they going to be eat-
ing? So that is a real motivation or I can say
challenge.
I sometimes wish we had more than 24 hours in a
day.
Summary
The A to Z story shows that high-quality LLINs can be
cost-effectively manufactured in Africa, where malaria is
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other protectionist measures that might lead to signifi-
cantly higher-priced local ITN production [19]. It
demonstrates that health products can be developed by
leveraging existing strengths in low-resource settings,
leading to health, economic, and technological benefits
for these regions. Many such opportunities have been
documented in the African context, such as manufactur-
ing common medical supplies [20].
Ultimately, success is enabled by responsiveness to
opportunities, willingness to invest and take risks, ability
to execute, and strong leadership. A to Z and its part-
ners have not only successfully created an African
source for public health goods, but have demonstrated
consistent commitment to the endeavor. In the absence
of the private enterprise A to Z, it is doubtful that any
local public entity would be producing LLINs at the
same scale.
Donor funding for bednets played a critical role in
creating demand for A to Z’s bednets, suggesting that
donor and multilateral agencies can kickstart Southern
manufacturing by integrating such enterprises into their
supply chain. Local funding, scaling up manufacturing,
technology transfer, and partnerships with Sumitomo
and others all played important roles in A to Z’sa s c e n t ,
as did perceived benefits of local employment and capa-
city-building; regulatory issues and procurement rules
acted as barriers.
Yet continued success is not assured – the looming
plateau in demand for LLINs, competition from
imported LLINs sourced from Asian manufacturers, and
the recent founding of multiple African sites for LLIN
manufacturing all suggest the need for continued inno-
vation to stay in business. In this and other aspects, A
to Z is a microcosm of the African-led health innovation
enterprise as a whole.
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